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VICHIAN MORAL PHILOSOPHY: PRUDENCE AS JURISPRUDENCE
DONALD PHILLIP VERENE*
INTRODUCTION
In modem schemes of education, eloquence, prudence, and jurispru-
dence have disappeared from the liberal arts. The artes liberales, as Cicero
understood them, were what was needed for human freedom, for human
beings to understand themselves as capable of choice, authority, and self-
determination. To speak well is to think well and to think well is to com-
mand the basis for acting well. Human happiness, at least as Aristotle un-
derstood it, as eudaimonia, is based on the ideal of acting in accord with
excellence. Excellence requires the study of eloquence, prudence, and ju-
risprudence. The guide for human prudence is jurisprudence in the sense
that the law is understood as the codification of civil wisdom. The law ap-
proached in this way, which is the way both Vico and the Ancients ap-
proached it, is the individual's guide to acting well. The laws are the
individual's teacher. Seen in this way, the laws are not a system of restric-
tions on free actions but are the principles whereby man as both a social
and a rational animal can engage in self-knowledge and self-determination.
My purpose in this essay is, following Vico, to address the question: Is
it possible to reconceive eloquence, prudence, and jurisprudence as a nec-
essary part of the liberal arts?
I. A DEFENSE OF THE STUDIA HUMANITATIS
In his Latin pedagogical oration, De nostri temporis studiorum ra-
tione, translated as On the Study Methods of Our Time, Vico takes up in a
new way the famous querelle des anciens et modernes which took shape in
France in the late 1600s in the writings of Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle
* Charles Howard Candler Professor of Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy, and Director of the
Institute for Vico Studies, Emory University. I wish to thank my Emory colleague, Michael Sullivan,
for his most useful comments on this essay in its manuscript version. Citations to classical works of
Greek and Latin literature throughout are to the editions of the Loeb Classical Library of Harvard
University Press.
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and Charles Perrault.1 This quarrel, as formulated by these French thinkers,
occurs within the domain of letters, raising the question of whether the
writings of the modems were equal or superior to those of the ancient po-
ets. Vico recasts the quarrel as a more general one between two ideals of
knowledge that have within them two conceptions of human education. He
asks: "Which study method is finer and better, ours or the Ancients'? '2
Vico stands at a crossroads in the history of Western thought. He is
the inheritor of Italian Renaissance Humanism that replaced the scholastic
pedagogy of the trivium and quadrivium (the study of grammar, rhetoric,
and logic coupled with arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy-the
seven liberal arts) with the studia humanitatis (concentrating on grammar,
rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy)3 and the new mathematical
sciences of nature extending from Galileo to Newton that replaced the old
Aristotelian physics and metaphysics of primary and secondary substances.
Descartes, in his Discourse on Method, captured the essence of what it
means to be a modem thinker. His fourfold method provided a simple and
elegant statement of what it means to reason in the manner of the new sci-
ences: (1) begin by accepting only what can be taken to be evidently true,
(2) divide each of the difficulties involved in a problem into as many parts
as possible, (3) ascend in considering them in a step-by-step fashion from
the most simple to the most complex, and (4) proceed with such care and
comprehensiveness as to leave nothing out.4 Such right reasoning will pro-
vide the investigator with the solution to any problem in any proper field of
study. Descartes' method fulfils the distinctively modem quest, the quest
for certainty. Since certainty is the goal, any field of study that is not by
nature dedicated to it is not a proper field of study and is to be excluded
from human knowledge.
1. GIAMBATTISTA VICO, ON THE STUDY METHODS OF OUR TIME (Elio Gianturco trans., Cornell
Univ. Press 1990) (1709) [hereinafter STUDY METHODS]; 1 GIAMBATTISTA VICO, De Nostri Temporis
Studiorum Ratione, in OPERE 87, 87-215 (Andrea Battistini ed., Mondadori 1990). An excellent treat-
ment of the quarrel of the Ancients and Modems is Hans Baron, The Querelle of the Ancients and the
Moderns as a Problem for Renaissance Scholarship, in RENAISSANCE ESSAYS 95, 95-114 (Paul Oskar
Kristeller & Philip P. Wiener eds., Univ. of Rochester Press 1992) (1968). In regard to Vico see Sergio
Campailla, A Proposito di Vico nella Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, in 3 BOLLETTINO DEL
CENTRO DI STUDI VICHIANI 181-92 (1973). Campailla's essay considers the quarrel as it relates to both
Vico's De nostri and his later oration, De mente heroica. For a translation of this see Giambattista Vico,
On the Heroic Mind, in VICO AND CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT 228, 228-45 (Giorgio Tagliacozzo,
Michael Mooney & Donald Phillip Verene eds., Humanities Press 1979).
2. STUDY METHODS, supra note 1, at 5.
3. For an account of the studia humanitatis see DONALD R. KELLEY, RENAISSANCE HUMANISM
1-13 (1991).
4. 1 RENE DESCARTES, Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One's Reason and
Seeking the Truth in the Sciences, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES 111, 120-21 (John
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch & Anthony Kenny trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1985) [hereinafter Discourse on the Method].
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The pedagogy that is in accord with this conception of knowledge (as
Vico notes in the Study Methods) is the Port-Royal Logic of Antoine Ar-
nauld and Pierre Nicole. 5 It teaches that there are two methods of think-
ing-analysis and synthesis. Method as such is "the art of arranging well a
succession of various thoughts, or for discerning the truth when we are
ignorant of it, or for proving it to others when we already know it."6 The
method of analysis offers training in critical thinking. We discover what
something is by taking it apart and understanding its connections. The
method of synthesis is a method of composition and offers training in how
to make understandable to others what has been found. Clart6 dominates
both of these methods; the one produces clarity of thought and the other
produces clarity of statement of it.
The Cartesian conception of knowledge and the doctrine of pedagogy
implicit in it is based on the exclusion of humane letters from right reason-
ing. In the Discourse, Descartes explicitly excludes the study of fables and
histories from the curriculum of those who would wish to acquire knowl-
edge: "[T]hose who regulate their conduct by examples drawn from these
works are liable to fall into the excesses of the knights-errant in our tales of
chivalry, and conceive plans beyond their powers."'7 He excludes oratory
and poetry on the ground that they are gifts of the mind, not fruits of study.
He says: "Those with the strongest reasoning and the most skill at ordering
their thoughts so as to make them clear and intelligible are always the most
persuasive, even if they speak only low Breton and have never learned
rhetoric."'8 He adds that the best poets need no theory of poetry.
In regard to the study of morals, he says he "compared the moral writ-
ings of the ancient pagans to very proud and magnificent palaces built only
on sand and mud."9 With the exception of grammar, Descartes dismisses
one by one the fields distinctive to the studia humanitatis, from rhetoric
through moral philosophy. They, along with the study of ancient languages
(Greek having a particular importance for the Humanists), 10 are broadening
in the sense that travel, along with awareness of other customs, broadens,
but at most they can afford pleasure, at worst they are corruptions of rea-
soning (or at least distractions from its proper employment).
5. ANTOINE ARNAULD & PIERRE NICOLE, LA LOGIQUE OU L'ART DE PENSER (Pierre Clair &
Franqois Girbal eds., Presses Universitaires de France 1965) (1662).
6. Id. at 299 (my translation).
7. Discourse on the Method, supra note 4, at 114.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. For example, see Battista Guarino's insistence (following Quintilian) on the importance of the
study of Greek in Battista Guarino, A Program of Teaching and Learning, in HUMANIST EDUCATIONAL
TREATISES 260, 281-83 (Craig W. Kallendorfed. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2002).
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The pedagogy of the Renaissance Humanists is devoted to the ideal of
civil wisdom which they revive from the Ancients. The second-century
writer Aulus Gellius holds that the Latin humanitas has the meaning of the
Greek paideia-the education of the whole man by coursing through the
whole circle of the human arts, literally the encyclo-paideia. 11 The comple-
tion of this circle produces the citizen, one who has the wisdom necessary
to the prolongation of the civitas--civic order, the city. Descartes rejects
the studia humanitatis because the fields it embraces are all by nature based
upon reasoning that is probable, not reasoning that aims at certainty.
The aim of humanistic education is prudence. Vico says:
[I]n science, the outstanding intellect is that which succeeds in reducing
a large multitude of physical effects to a single cause; in the domain of
prudence, excellence is accorded to those who ferret out the greatest pos-
sible number of causes which may have produced a single event, and
who are able to conjecture which of all these causes is the true one.
12
He concludes further: "[I]t is an error to apply to the prudent conduct of life
the abstract criterion of reasoning that obtains in the domain of science."
13
The counterpart textbook to the Port-Royal Logic for the Vichian hu-
manist is the Institutes of Justinian, coupled with Cicero's and Quintilian's
prescriptions for the instruction (institutio) of the orator. Institutio is a
method, an arrangement or order. An institution is something "put in
place," established or constructed according to a particular order. Cicero's
Orator and Quintilian's Institutes require that the orator have a command
of the principles of rhetoric, poetics, history (from which to draw exam-
ples), and moral philosophy. The principles of moral philosophy come not
from logic, but from law. In the law we find, as the Institutes of Justinian
advocates, how to "live honourably; harm nobody; give everyone his
due."14
Vico reminds us in the Study Methods that what the Greeks call phi-
losophia the Romans call iurisprudentia. Behind the law as the repository
of moral philosophy is the Socratic ideal of self-knowledge, which, as we
find in Alcibiades15 and as Socrates says in Phaedrus,16 goes back to the
Delphic inscription on the Temple of Apollo, gndthi seauton, "know thy-
11. 2 AULuS GELLIUS, ATTIC NIGHTS 457 (John C. Rolfe trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1927).
12. STUDY METHODS, supra note 1, at 34.
13. Id. at 35.
14. J. INST. 1.1.3 (JUSTINIAN'S INSTITUTES (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., Cornell Univ.
Press 1987)).
15. PLATO, Alcibiades, in CHARMIDES, ALCIBIADES I AND II, HIPPARCHUS, THE LOVERS.
THEAGES, MINOS, EPINOMIS 173 (W.R.M. Lamb trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1927).
16. PLATO, Phaedrus, in EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, PHAEDO, PHAEDRUS 405, 421-23 (Har-
old North Fowler trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1914).
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self." Its corresponding instruction, mden agan, "nothing too much" is the
first assertion of prudence as the key to human action.
What Socratic moral philosophy seeks by the elenchos, the dialectic of
question and answer, the study of jurisprudence or the science of law seeks
by an understanding of the codification of custom which contains the wis-
dom or authority of human tradition. The single great Renaissance Human-
ist statement of moral philosophy is Pico della Mirandola's Oratio de
hominis dignitate, or Oration on the Dignity of Man, the work to which
Vico compares his own conception of a "new science" as its successor and
furtherance. 17
The ideal of the Humanist pedagogical tradition is instruction in the
interconnection of sapientia, eloquentia, and prudentia. This threefold ideal
has its origin in Cicero's De partitione oratoria. Cicero says:
Virtue has a twofold meaning, for it is exhibited either in knowledge or
in conduct. The virtue that is designated prudence [prudentia] and intel-
ligence and the most impressive name of all, wisdom [sapientia], exer-
cises its influence by knowledge alone .... The virtue of prudence when
displayed in a man's private affairs is usually termed personal sagacity
and when in public affairs political wisdom.18
Of eloquence and wisdom, Cicero says: "[E]loquence [eloquentia] is
nothing else but wisdom [sapientia] delivering copious utterance.. .. "19
Vico, in the Study Methods, echoes this assertion of Cicero: "What is elo-
quence, in effect, but wisdom, ornately and copiously delivered in words
appropriate to the common opinion of mankind?" 20 Vico says: "There is
only one 'art' of prudence, and this art is philosophy."'21 He says further:
"[A]t Rome, the philosophers themselves were jurists .... [I]n Rome, sa-
pientia corresponded perfectly to justice and statesmanship. '22
Vico also says that there was a time when philosophy "was handed
down by its teachers in a manner fitted to foster eloquence, i.e., the attempt
was made to fuse philosophy with eloquence. Demosthenes was a product
of the Lyceum; Cicero, of the Academy: there is no doubt that they were
17. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man, in THE RENAISSANCE
PHILOSOPHY OF MAN 223 (Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller & John Herman Randall, Jr. eds.,
Elizabeth Livermore Forbes trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1948). In Vico see GIAMBATTISTA VICO,
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO 156-57 (Max Harold Fisch & Thomas Goddard Bergin
trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1944) (1728 & 1731) [hereinafter AUTOBIOGRAPHY].
18. CICERO, De Oratore, in DE ORATORE: BOOK III, DE FATO, PARADOXA STOICORUM, DE
PARTITIONE ORATORIA 2,367 (H. Rackham trans.. Harvard Univ. Press 1942).
19. Id. at 369.
20. STUDY METHODS, supra note 1, at 78.
21. Id. at48.
22. Id. at 49.
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the two foremost speakers of the two most splendid of languages. '23 He
goes on to say that among the modems philosophy is taught in an abstract
way such that all of its ancient connection with eloquence is lost. There is
no jurisprudence that can be constructed from Descartes' method. "Law"
and "jurisprudence" are not key terms that appear in the indexing of Des-
cartes' major writings. Although the tree of knowledge that Descartes de-
scribes in his letter prefacing the Principles contains morals as a top
branch, all his philosophy as a whole offers or can offer is his provisional
code of conduct, placed in the third part of the Discourse, and his stoical
views expressed in his exchange of letters with Princess Elizabeth of Bo-
hemia.24 Descartes has no conception of prudence beyond that typical of
modem moral philosophy: that prudent action is recommended when no
clearly rational criterion can be formulated.
Vico's approach in the Study Methods is not the opposite side of the
coin that Descartes mints. Descartes denies the validity of those forms of
thought in which the Ancients and their Humanist successors excel. But
Vico does not deny the validity of the types of knowledge produced by the
Modems. He states at the onset of the Study Methods that his intention is to
seek a balance between the scientific rationalism of the Modems and the
rhetorical civil wisdom of the Ancients. 25 The principle of balance allows
Vico to resurrect the study of the Ancients as necessary to a proper human
education. This education must follow a twofold pattern and to comprehend
this it is necessary to be precise concerning what Vico means by "method."
I have remarked on the term "method" in my preface to the repub-
lished edition of Elio Gianturco's translation. 26 In the Latin title the geni-
tive plural "studiorum" should be "studies" and "ratione" should be
singular, "method." Thus correct to Vico's original is "method of studies,"
not "study methods." "Ratio" is a prominent word in Latin, well known for
the difficulties attached to it in rendering it into English. Among its
straightforward meanings are "a drawing up," "a reckoning" or "account",
it also has the sense of a scheme, system, order, or method. Vico's "stu-
diorum ratione" is a "system or curriculum of studies," implying a theory
of the temporal order in which certain studies in a student's education
should occur. A strong reason for retaining "method," however, is Vico's
reference in his autobiography to this oration as "del metodo di studiare,"
which is cognate to the English "of the method of study."
23. Id. at 37.
24. Discourse on the Method, supra note 4, at 186; 3 RENE DESCARTES, Letters, in THE PHILOSO-
PHICAL WRITINGS OF DESCARTES, supra note 4, at 256-83.
25. STUDY METHODS, supra note 1, at 5-6.
26. Donald Phillip Verene, Preface to STUDY METHODS, supra note 1, at xii-xiii.
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Vico's autobiography is written as a work in opposition to Descartes'
claim that the Discourse is an autobiographical account of how he made his
discovery. In it Vico says: "We shall not here feign what Ren6 Descartes
craftily feigned as to the method of his studies simply in order to exalt his
own philosophy and mathematics and degrade all the other studies included
in divine and human erudition. ' 27 In this statement Vico is using "metodo"
in the sense of Descartes' claim to an order or ratio of the development of
his thought. Descartes' "mthode" in the title of his Discourse clearly refers
to the fourfold method he formulates, but Vico here takes it in a second
sense-that of the genesis of Descartes' own thought. Vico's method is the
"genetic method. ' 28 For, as Vico says, he wrote his autobiography as a
historian, narrating step-by-step the series of his studies that is at the basis
of his development as a man of letters.
II. MEMORY AND WISDOM
Vico's balance between the Modems' and the Ancients' conceptions
of knowledge is not one of weighing the pros and cons of each. His solu-
tion is to apply the genetic method to human education. Thus the abstrac-
tion of thought that is required for analytic geometry, the sciences, and for
comprehending the terms of metaphysics is to be taught to mature minds.
The education of children should focus on the development of those powers
of mind that will later be required for civil wisdom: "[T]he teacher should
give the greatest care to the cultivation of the pupil's memory, which,
though not exactly the same as imagination, is almost identical with it. '' 29
Vico could agree with the Renaissance program of teaching and learning of
Battista Guarino, that the young should first attempt "to acquire spontane-
ously a real desire to learn-something a teacher cannot give them from the
outside .... Let them always keep in mind the teaching of the Greek Soc-
rates: if you are eager to learn, you will learn much.' 30
Vico says the arts in which memory and imagination are combined are
especially painting, poetry, oratory, and jurisprudence. Instead of the ab-
stractions of logic the young pupil should-as known to the Ancients-be
taught plane geometry because it requires and depends upon the use of
vivid images and trains in the capacity to form them. If early education is
27. AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 17, at 113; see DONALD PHILLIP VERENE, THE NEW ART OF
AUTOBIOGRAPHY: AN ESSAY ON THE LIFE OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO WRI7TENBYHIMSELF (1991).
28. Max Fisch, in his Preface to the autobiography, writes: "Vico's [autobiography] has the
unique interest of being the first application of the genetic method by an original thinker to his own
writings." Max Fisch, Preface to AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 17, at v.
29. STUDY METHODS, supra note 1, at 14.
30. Guarino, supra note 10, at 263.
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not directed to the development of memory and imagination, we will pro-
duce a hollow mind and personality that is capable of manipulating abstrac-
tions and following methodological forms of thought but incapable of
originality, especially of forming new beginning points for thought. One
simple way to say this is that such blank-minded adults will lack the ability
of metapherein, of making metaphors. Aristotle says: "[T]he greatest asset
is a capacity for metaphor. This alone cannot be acquired from another, and
is a sign of natural gifts ....
Memory and imagination, as Vico says in the New Science, are closely
connected to ingenuity (in Italian, ingegno; in Latin, ingenium) 32 as the
power to form hypotheses in science and metaphors in the arts, to perceive
the similarity in dissimilars. Ingenuity, like metaphor, its product, cannot
be learned from others as an adult. The mind must be led to it at the earliest
age. Ingenuity is not method. There is no method for ingenuity because
method is rigidified ingenuity. Once ingenuity leads us to a discovery, the
means of the discovery can be articulated and formulated as a method to
then be followed. Descartes' method is not a product of method. It is a
product of his own ingenuity that then can be apprehended by everyone
with bon sens, adapted, and followed.
Vico would look on in horror at the current basing of the earliest years
of children's education on mastery of the computer and electronic-based
activity. Students whose sole object of concentration is thus directed will,
as adults, have no ability to tell a story, certainly not a good story, nor to
narrate their existence to themselves. In such education, wonder (thauma),
in which philosophy originates and continues to require, as Aristotle says,
33
will never appear because the pupil never stands before things pure and
simple, unaided by the medium which is itself the message. As Gianturco
says, in beginning his introduction to the translation of the Study Methods:
"We live in a Cartesian world, a world of scientific research, technology,
and gadgets, which invade and condition our lives .... -"34 In such a world,
education in social management and counseling replaces education in civil
wisdom.
31. Aristotle, Poetics, in POETICS, ON THE SUBLIME, ON STYLE 27, 115 (Stephen Halliwell ed. &
trans., Harvard Univ. Press corr. ed. 1999).
32. GIAMBATTISTA Vico, THE NEW SCIENCE OF GIAMBATTISTA VICO 1819 (Thomas Goddard
Bergin & Max Harold Fisch trans., Cornell Univ. Press, paperback unabr. ed. 1984) (1744) [hereinafter
NEW SCIENCE].
33. 1 ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 13 (Hugh Tredennick trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1933) [herein-
after METAPHYSICS].
34. Elio Gianturco, Translator's Introduction to STUDY METHODS, supra note 1, at xxi.
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Vico's understanding of the human world of nations is itself based on
what he calls "a jurisprudence of mankind, '35 that he derives from the Ro-
man conception of ius gentium, that claim of the Digest or Corpus iuris
civilis that there is a part of Roman law that it has in common with all other
systems of law. Vico's claim is that the ius gentium is not static in its uni-
versality. It is tied to his law of the three ages that describe the develop-
ment of each nation in its rise, maturity, and fall-the "ideal eternal
history" of an age of gods, of heroes, and of men. In each of these ages
there is a different sense of law but each sense is universal or common to
all nations.36
Vico adapts ius gentium to a doctrine of history that comprehends his-
tory as cyclic. For Vico as for the Digest, as mentioned above, jurispru-
dence is philosophy. Of his First New Science he says "we proposed to the
universities of Europe that jurisprudence should be treated in the whole
context of human and divine erudition, and on that account we put it above
all the other sciences." '37 Vico's jurisprudence of ius gentium, that he calls
ius gentium naturale or "the natural law of the peoples" is his answer to the
seventeenth-century natural-law theorists who adhere to a doctrine of the
origin of society in a social contract or covenant. This ius naturale of social
contract theory he calls the "law of the philosophers," that is, as an abstract
ideal based on an abstract sense of reason.
From this digression, let me return to the threefold principle of sapien-
tia-eloquentia-prudentia. What Vico offers us, I think, is captured in the
meanings of these three terms. What they express is what we can set
against the domination of the modem in an effort to balance the modem
with what they contain. They suggest a standpoint from which to attempt to
reclaim the human in a world in which we risk rational madness, for Carte-
sianism offers no genuine guide for life. My remarks are only a modest
attempt at the resurrection of the Ancients in a world which sees no reason
for them. I am in the position of Vico, when he returned to Naples from
nine years of service as tutor to the children of the Rocca family in their
castle in the Cilento-a stranger in my own land.38
35. The title of chapter 12 of book I in the First New Science is "On the Idea of a Jurisprudence of
Mankind [del genere umano]." See GIAMBATTISTA Vico, THE FIRST NEW SCIENCE (Leon Pompa ed. &
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) (1725).
36. NEW SCIENCE, supra note 32, 922-24, 937-41.
37. Id. 1411.
38. AUTOBIOGRAPHY, supra note 17, at 134.
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Wisdom, eloquence, and prudence are parallel to what is attributed to
the poets by Horace39 and to the orator by Cicero 40: to instruct, delight, and
move. These two sets of terms can be seen as the key to moral philosophy
as part of the studia humanitatis. Moral philosophy is the love of wisdom
as it relates to the comprehension of human nature. This wisdom, in order
to be comprehended, must be put into words that attract human attention,
and once wisdom is made to speak in this way, what is said should have an
effect on the hearers. The effect of the speech on the passions will move the
hearers to act in a particular manner. Wisdom rightly spoken becomes wis-
dom rightly realized in action. Let us take each of these in turn and exam-
ine how they guide forensics.
Sapientia or wisdom, Cicero says in the Tusculan Disputations, "is the
knowledge of things divine and human and acquaintance with the cause of
each of them."'41 He repeats this definition in De officiis, adding that this is
how wisdom is defined "by the philosophers of old."'42 Vico, in the New
Science, referring to Marcus Varro's lost work on The Antiquities of Divine
and Human Things, says: "True wisdom [sapienza], then, should teach the
knowledge of divine institutions in order to conduct human institutions to
the highest good."'43 He adds that "Wisdom among the gentiles began with
the Muse defined by Homer in a golden passage in the Odyssey as 'knowl-
edge of good and evil,' and later called divination."44 Vico says of the
Muses that they "'sing' in the sense in which the Latin verbs canere and
cantare mean 'foretell'. ' 45 Vico has in mind the power of the Muses first
attributed to them by Hesiod: that they sing of what was, is, and is to come.
Their songs then are divinatory. The purpose of divination is to acquire a
knowledge of the actions of the divine as they affect natural and human
events-as above, so below. Divination is the origin of our need to acquire
a knowledge of good and evil. Wisdom from its earliest beginnings, then, is
in Vico's view tied to a moral or civil aim.
Vico's claim that true wisdom must conduct human things or institu-
tions toward the highest good is a Socratic claim. Socrates wishes to make
no one the worse for knowing him and to live such that he can pass from
39. HORACE, Ars Poetica, in SATIRES, EPISTLES AND ARS POETICA 442, 479 (H. Rushton Fair-
claugh trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1929).
40. CICERO, Brutus, in BRUTUS, ORATOR 18, 157 (G.L. Hendrickson & H.M. Hubbell trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1939).
41. CICERO, TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS 393 (J.E. King trans., Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1945)
[hereinafter TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS].
42. CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 173 (Walter Miller trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1975).





life into death following the maxim that no harm can come to a good man.
Cicero says: "Socrates ... was the first to call philosophy down from the
heavens and set her in the cities of men and bring her also into their homes
and compel her to ask questions about life and morality and things good
and evil .... ,,46 Vico, in his address to the Academy of Oziosi, the last
oration of his career, claims that eloquence requires "the study of morals,
which principally informs the wisdom of man, to which more than in the
other parts of philosophy Socrates divinely applied himself, whence of him
it was said: 'Socrates recalled moral philosophy from the heavens.' 47 With
Socrates, philosophy reorients itself from the Pre-Socratic's concern with
the heavens and the cosmos to concern for the human or civil world. Socra-
tes also ties philosophy to the device of the question, which is the essence
of dialectic and forensic oratory.
The basis of moral philosophy or moral wisdom is not a matter of the
definition of terms, the formulation of arguments, and the logical analysis
of problems. Moral philosophy ultimately rests on seeing whatever is in
question as a whole, and, as Vico says in the Study Methods, "the whole is
really the flower of wisdom."'48 To see anything as a whole is to compre-
hend it by the genetic method of the Muses-to grasp it in terms of what it
was, is, and will become. The Renaissance Florentine historian Francesco
Guicciardini puts it thus:
All that which has been in the past and is at present will be again in the
future. But both the names and the appearances of things change, so that
he who does not have a good eye will not recognize them. Nor will he
know how to grasp a norm of conduct or make a judgment by means of
observation. 49
Guicciardini's "good eye," buono occhio, is the element necessary to
moral wisdom. The good eye is the mind's eye coupled with the body's
eye. Ingenuity is rooted in memory. Memory or Mnemosyne is the mother
of the Muses. Wisdom is the memory of the past connected through imagi-
nation to the present and projected by the power of ingenuity into a future
state. Thus wisdom, like divination, is an attempt to master time, to see
beyond present circumstances by recalling their basis in the past. To pursue
moral philosophy is to think in time, to think in terms of origins and the
ends implicit in them that are likely to develop. Such thought is always
46. TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS, supra note 41, at 435.
47. GIAMBATTISTA VICO, The Academies and the Relation Between Philosophy and Eloquence, in
STUDY METHODS, supra note 1, at 89 (translated by Donald Phillip Verene). Vico is paraphrasing
Horace. HORACE, supra note 39, at 477.
48. STUDY METHODS, supra note 1, at 77.
49. FRANCESCO GUICcIARDINI, RicoRDi 131 (rev. ed. 1977) (my translation).
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probable; it never follows Descartes' method or satisfies his criterion of
certainty. Moral reasoning does not aim at certainty but it does aim at
knowledge per causas.
It is often said that Socrates said that he only knows that he knows
nothing-the doctrine of "Socratic ignorance." This is only partially true.
Socratic philosophy approaches any subject matter from this standpoint,
but in the Apology, Socrates, in his examination of the claim of the Delphic
oracle that he possessed wisdom, concludes that he is wise at least in hu-
man things.50 However, to be wise in human things requires some knowl-
edge of divine things or one could not know the difference between them
and human things. Only the gods are truly wise because only they can stand
outside of time. To say what a thing is is to say what it is and what it is not.
Socrates knows or can aspire to know, as can we, this much: what the hu-
man is or what it is not. The human is always in time and the knowledge of
it always requires memory, imagination, and ingenuity.
These are the three elements that Vico says define memory in the
sense that Memory or Mnemosyne is the mother of the Muses: "Memory
thus has three different aspects: memory [memoria] when it remembers
things, imagination [fantasia] when it alters or imitates them, and ingenuity
[ingegno] when it gives them a new turn or puts them into proper arrange-
ment and relationship."'51 The three Vichian elements that define memory
also define wisdom. Thus wisdom is nothing but memory considered from
a further perspective. Wisdom requires the art of the Muses to join past,
present, and future in order to achieve the narrative that brings thought into
a whole concerning the particular subject matter to which thought is di-
rected.
This narrative of past, present, and future becomes wisdom when we
add to this sequence the principle of necessity, and the narrative then offers
an account of causes--of what had, has, and will have to be. The narrative
of the whole combines philology with philosophy in that it answers, of a
given subject matter, the questions of both what and why. Memory, the
instrument of philological investigations, brings forth the details of the
subject, or its "what," and once the "what" is structured by the middle term
of the imagination, ingenuity, the instrument of philosophical reasoning,
produces the "why." The subject matter so ordered as a whole in thought
must then be put fully into language.
50. PLATO, Apology, in EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, PHAEDO, PHAEDRUS, supra note 16, at 79.




The ideal of the Humanist is to be "wisdom speaking," "la sapienza
che parla." If wisdom is to grasp a subject matter as a whole and hold it in
thought, eloquence is the ability to make it into a complete speech. Quintil-
ian says: "The verb eloqui means to bring out and communicate to an audi-
ence the thoughts you have formed in your mind. Without this, everything
that has gone before is useless, like a sword that is put up and will not come
out of its scabbard. '52 Eloquence is necessary for all three types of ora-
tion-forensic, epideictic, and deliberative. Our interest here is forensic,
specifically judicial eloquence. The parts and principles of forensic speech
have been well known since the Latins, who took them from the Greeks.
We find them referred to in Plato's Phaedrus,53 and Quintilian, in introduc-
ing each part, discusses the Greek term for it.
All eloquence requires copia. The successful orator should attempt to
imitate the copiousness of Demosthenes and Cicero. In his oration to the
Academy of Oziosi Vico speaks of the "invincible enthymeme" of
Demosthenes, "which he formed by means of a very well regulated excess,
going outside his case into quite distant things with which he tempered the
lightning flashes of his arguments, which, when striking, amazed the listen-
ers so much the more by how much he had diverted them."'54 Vico says
Cicero was "endowed with the felicity of his copiousness, which, like a
great winter torrent, overflows its banks, floods countrysides, crashes down
over cliffs and hillsides, rolling before it heavy stones and ancient oaks;
and triumphant over all that had given him resistance, he returns to the
proper riverbed of his case."' 55 The eloquent speech has within it all that
there is on its subject, great and small. It is copia that distinguishes the
great orator.
Cicero raises the question of into how many parts a speech in the
courts falls: "Four parts. Two of them, the statement of the facts [narratio]
and the proof [confirmatio], serve to establish the case, and two, the exor-
dium [principium] and the peroration [peroratio], to influence the mind of
the audience." '56 The rhetorical principles of each of these parts are most
fully discussed in the fourth, fifth, and sixth books of Quintilian's Institutio
oratoria or The Orator's Education. They appear in condensed form in
52. 3 QUINTILIAN, THE ORATOR'S EDUCATION 317 (Donald A. Russell ed. & trans., Harvard
Univ. Press 2001).
53. PLATO, supra note 16, at 537.
54. Vico, supra note 47, at 87.
55. Id. at 88.
56. CICERO, supra note 18, at 313.
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Vico's own Institutes, the textbook he wrote in Latin and from which he
taught rhetoric and jurisprudence throughout his career.57 My remarks that
follow are a characterization of each of these parts.
The four parts are four separate but connected speeches which form a
tetralogy. Tetralogia is a Greek term originally used in oratory to refer to
the group of speeches (logoi) delivered in a lawsuit. It is connected with the
Attic orator Antiphon (c. 480-411 B.C.), who was the first logographos,
writing speeches for litigants. According to Plutarch, Antiphon was the first
to publish rules for oratory. 58 Tetralogy is further associated with the set of
three tragedies accompanied by a satyr play as performed on the Attic stage
at the festival of Dionysus. Antiphon is also said to have written trage-
dies. 59 In ancient medicine, Galen attributes to Hippocrates the principle of
four mutually interacting qualities that function in the genesis and destruc-
tion of all things. These concern the opposites, warm and cold and moist
and dry. 60 They have association with the four kinds of motion that Aris-
totle analyzes in his famous doctrine of four causes-material, formal,
efficient, final. 61
I mention these examples because tetralogy is a very strong form in
ordering thought and human affairs, whether in the law, in art, or in sci-
ence. A four-part sequence is a natural sequence of completion. There is
great strength in a beginning, a double middle, and an end (birth, youth-old
age, death).
Quintilian states the following concerning the "layout of forensic
Causes":
[W]hat is the function of a Prooemium; what are the principles of Narra-
tive; how credibility is achieved in Proofs, either in confirming our own
propositions or in demolishing those of our opponents; wherein lies the
force of the Epilogue, if we have either to refresh the judge's memory by
brief recapitulation of the facts, or (much more important) to stir his
emotions.
62
The purpose of the Prooemium (the term from Greek signifying sim-
ply "beginning" that Quintilian prefers) or Peroration is threefold: to "pre-
57. GIAMBATTISTA ViCO, Institutiones Oratoriae, in THE ART OF RHETORIC (INSTITUTIONES
ORATORIAE, 1711-1741) (Giorgio A. Pinton & Arthur W. Shippee eds. & trans., Rodopi 1996) [herein-
after Institutiones Oratoriae].
58. 10 PLUTARCH, Lives of the Ten Orators, in MORALIA 345-47 (Harold North Fowler trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1936).
59. Id. at 351.
60. GALEN, ON THE NATURAL FACILITIES 13-15 (Arthur John Brock trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1916).
61. 1 ARISTOTLE, THE PHYSICS 123-31 (Philip H. Wicksteed & Francis M. Comford trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1957); METAPHYSICS, supra note 33, at 211-21.
62. 2 QUINTILIAN, supra note 52, at 179.
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pare the hearer to be more favorably inclined toward [the speaker] for the
rest of the proceedings," to make him attentive, and to make him ready to
learn.63 These must be maintained throughout the proceedings, but they are
especially important to establish in the initial stage. The goodwill that is
sought can be derived either from persons or from the case itself. The dig-
nity and effort of the judge or those hearing the case can be praised, or, if
the cause itself contains positive features to which those involved may
relate, such features can be emphasized.
It is especially necessary "that no unfamiliar word, no overbold meta-
phor, no anachronism or poeticism should be detected in the
Prooemium. ' '64 The speaker should employ commonplaces that are rich in
content and easily shared by the hearers. If a long and difficult statement of
the facts is to follow in the Narrative, Cicero's line in Pro Cluentio is rec-
ommended: "I request you, gentlemen, not to take it amiss if I open my
case at a point in the somewhat distant past; for you will much more easily
grasp the ultimate issues in this case if you are aware of its first begin-
nings." 65
The Narrative is to cover not only the facts presented in a coherent
progressive relation but also an account of the nature of the person in-
volved (who he is), of the place (where the events of the cause occurred),
of the time (when they occurred), and of the causes involved. Quintilian
points out that addressing the causes is like what "historians very often
introduce when they explain how a war or a rebellion or a plague came
about."'66 Quintilian holds that there are two types of Narrative in forensic
cases--one is the exposition of the cause itself and the other is the exposi-
tion of matters that are relevant to the cause. The Narrative is not often one
simple story. If there are multiple charges, each may require a narrative
within the Narrative.
The Narrative, however, should be lucid and as brief as possible in or-
der to be persuasive. Most important to the Narrative is that it be plausible.
Quintilian is emphatic that plausibility is crucial even if the case being
made is clearly true. He says: "a Narrative which is wholly in our favor
should be plausible, when it is in fact true. There are many true things that
are not very credible, and false things are frequently plausible. '67
63. Id. at 181-82.
64. Id. at 209.
65. CICERO, Pro Cluentio, in PRO LEGE MANILIA, PRO CAECINA, PRO CLUENTIO, PRO RABIRIO,
PERDUELLIONIS 222,233 (H. Grose Hodge trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1927).
66. 2 QUINTILIAN, supra note 52, at 221.
67. Id. at 237.
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This striving for credibility is especially important in the Narrative be-
cause it is not so that the facts are just the facts and speak for themselves,
as Descartes believes of the use of language-with his comment, in the
Discourse, that the person speaks well who speaks but low Breton and has
never learned rhetoric.68 Events need not be narrated in chronological or-
der. Credibility may dictate that they be told in the manner that is most
advantageous. Everything which is said throughout the proceedings must
be credible, but if the initial presentation of the facts of the case is not
credible, those hearing it will be lost from the start. 69
The Narrative as such must be free of obscurity or digression, but be-
tween the Narrative and Proof or Confirmation a deliberate Digression may
be appropriate. The Narration sets out the things to be proved and the Con-
firmation must now prove them. But before entering into it the Digression
may act as an end of the Narrative and beginning of the Proof. The Digres-
sion, Quintilian says, is a second kind of Prooemium to win over the judge
and hearers to the Proof.70 Quintilian expresses some skepticism concern-
ing the necessity or value in all cases for the Digression. The Digression, he
claims, can simply be an opportunity for the skilled speaker to display his
oratorical ability, calling attention to and advertising himself rather than
something essential to the case.
Vico, in his Institutes, is more positive. He sees the Digression as
functioning such that "after having narrated the case in a straightforward
manner, to formulate and propose the proposition of the case (causae pro-
positio) so that it seems to flow spontaneously by itself from the narra-
tion. ' 71 A traditional example of Digression is in Cicero's Second Speech
against Verres, which concerned the pillage of Sicily under Verres' office
as praetor. Cicero in his Digression took opportunity to praise the high
position, antiquity, and merits of Sicily as a province, which provided the
brilliant transition in his case. 72 There is an old principle in philosophy that
the most important philosophy is done in digression. Cicero's digression in
this speech may not offer a close example of this, but Vico's statement of
the principle of Digression makes the Digression as a rhetorical principle
similar to the philosophical.
The beginning of the Proof, or Confirmation, in the Proposition puts in
a few words what the orator must prove and about which the judge or jury
68. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
69. 2 QUINTILIAN, supra note 52, at 249.
70. Id. at 289.
71. Institutiones Oratoriae, supra note 57, at 81.




must pronounce sentence at the end of the proceeding. It thus puts forward
the Question-is the accused guilty or not of this particular charge under
the particular law or laws that apply? The Proposition is followed by the
Partition, which is the orderly enumeration of the divisions or parts of the
Partition involved. The Partition, as Vico says, is that "by which we list
how many, about what things, and in what order we shall present them. '73
These are added to the Proposition for the benefit of the hearers.
The Proofs or Confirmation can be divided into two types, nontechni-
cal and technical. Quintilian takes this division from Aristotle's description
of the two types of persuasion in the Rhetoric. Two important parts of non-
technical proofs are the use of previous legal judgments or precedents and
the employment of witnesses. Technical proofs, Aristotle says, are "all that
can be constructed by system and by our own efforts. Thus we have only to
make use of the former [nontechnical], whereas we must invent the latter
[technical]. ' 74 Precedents are the result of legal knowledge and legal re-
search. According to Quintilian, "Confirmation of such judgments is made
in two main ways: by the authority of the judges in the previous case, and
by the similarity of the cases in question." 75 Witnesses can appear in evi-
dence either in the form of written statements (which Quintilian says can
most easily be challenged) or in person. Witnesses appearing in person are
subject to examination by both the prosecution and the defense. Precedents
and witnesses are particular and internal to the case itself. They must be
given rhetorical context, but they are essentially evidence to be used.
Technical proofs concern various means of creating beliefs. They re-
quire, most importantly, the invention of arguments according to the prin-
ciples of rhetoric. In addition to arguments, Quintilian says, among
technical proofs are "signs" and examples. Signs are such as murder being
inferred from the presence of blood. A sign is usually not enough in itself
to convince, but it can be taken in combination with others such that it be-
comes a decisive piece of evidence. 76 Examples, Quintilian says, are para-
digms. They are what historians often use in historical arguments and
investigation and they are what Socrates often used in his method of ques-
tion and answer. 77 Examples or paradigms are adduced and made the basis
of arguments from analogy, forcing one's opponent to admit, of the thing in
question, what must obviously be true of the analogical example. Signs,
73. Institutiones Oratoriae, supra note 57, at 85.
74. ARISTOTLE, THE "ART" OF RHETORIC 15 (John Henry Freese trans., Harvard Univ. Press
1926).
75. 2 QUINTILIAN, supra note 52, at 327.
76. Id. at 363.
77. Id. at 431-33.
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examples, and arguments are based on techniques that are external to the
case. They employ a general logic by which what is needed in the cause
can be invented.
Quintilian says that a further kind of external proof is authority. This
is the introduction of testimonials that are given by minds free of preju-
dice.78 But the heart of the Proofs or Confirmation is argument. To employ
arguments the speaker must be schooled in the full range of what Cicero
and Aristotle treat in their writings on topics (loci or topoi), that is, in the
principles for inventing arguments appropriate to any subject. A knowledge
of topics requires extensive study, but it allows the orator to go in his mind
to various argument types, depending on whether, for example, the point at
issue is one of definition, similarity, contrariety, antecedent and conse-
quent, cause and effect, and the like. These are to be employed both in
pursuing a cause and in the refutation of the opponent's views. Arguments
take the two basic forms found in Aristotle-the syllogism (which Aristotle
thought to be a natural form of reason) and the enthymeme (logically a
condensed form of syllogism, omitting one proposition).
The Peroration or Epilogue is the concluding speech of the total ora-
tion. Its purpose is to place the whole cause before the judge and jury at
once and to make a powerful impression. This impression is gained by
recapitulation of the case coupled with appeal to emotion. Emotion is that
above all in which eloquence excels. Quintilian says that for the philoso-
phers emotion is a vice and it seems immoral for the judge to be distracted
from truth, but he holds that "emotional appeals are necessary if truth, jus-
tice, and the common good cannot be secured by other means."' 79 The ap-
peal to emotion may be made visually as well as verbally. Quintilian says,
all knew that Caesar had been killed. His body lay on the bier, "but it was
the clothing, wet with blood, that made the image of the crime so vivid that
Caesar seemed not to have been murdered, but to be being murdered there
and then." 80
The business of the Peroration is above all Amplification. Emotions
are played on throughout the proceedings, but this is especially important at
the point of its conclusion. Of the relation of Proofs to the Peroration Quin-
tilian says: "Proofs may lead the judges to think our Cause the better one,
but it is our emotional appeals that make them also want it to be so; and
what they want, they also believe." 81 The Cartesian conception of knowl-
78. Id. at 451-43.
79. 3 id. at 21.
80. Id. at 33.
81. Id. at 47.
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edge and human judgment acts as if truth is eloquent in itself. It is not. If it
should seem so in a given case, it is because the emotion it stirs is ignored.
The orator knows that the rational and the emotional are true counterparts.
Vico makes this point in his address to the Academy of Oziosi, and he at-
tributes it to Socrates. He says of the Academy of Oziosi, "heart and lan-
guage [literally lingua, "tongue"] are here reunited in their natural bond,
which Socrates 'full of philosophy in language and breast,' had firmly
brought together. '82 The ideal philosopher must balance the speech of the
heart and the mind, but cannot attempt to settle an issue strictly by appeal
to emotion, as Quintilian allows in juridical oration.
Thought, especially in moral, legal, aesthetic, political, and human
matters, generally never exists or functions apart from the passions and
emotion. To proceed otherwise is a mistake. Thus eloquence must affect
both reason and feeling. Every formulation of language has at once a cogni-
tive power and an emotional power, both of which affect the hearer. The
key to eloquence is to direct one's words to both of these powers. The
speaker must address the subject matter as a whole and in so doing use
language as a whole.
IV. PRUDENCE, JURISPRUDENCE, AND APPLIED ETHICS
Nowhere is this twofold nature of language more overlooked than in
modem moral theory. Modem ethics acts always as though moral choice
and moral decision, if rightly done, are the result of what can be placed in
arguments pro and con. Moral argument fills professional journals. It is
indeed a living for what are now legions of academics attached to universi-
ties, centers for ethics, environmental programs, hospitals, public health
programs, and agencies of social research. In this world the sun never sets
on the production of ethical arguments, which spill over into the world of
journalism. The dominant interest of modem ethics is "applied ethics."
Alasdair MacIntyre, in a little-known article, has rightly argued that
applied ethics rests on a mistake and that such an approach to ethics is dan-
gerous. 83 The mistake is to think that there can be or that there is a body of
ethical theoretical knowledge that can be applied to specific human prob-
lems. It is dangerous because when there is the semblance of such applica-
tion those involved can and do act upon it, potentially or actually,
producing consequences about which there is no real understanding. It is as
if one can do in ethics what can in fact be done in the fields of engineering,
82. VicO, supra note 47, at 86.
83. Alasdair Mac Intyre, Does Applied Ethics Rest on a Mistake?, 67 MONIST 498, 512 (1984).
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in which principles once proved out can be applied to produce a desired
product or result. Applied ethics is a modern industry or pseudo-industry,
keeping those in it forever busy.
How does the menagerie of the world of applied ethics come about? Is
there any alternative to it? The answer to this, I think, lies in recovering the
meaning of prudence from the Ancients and the Humanists-the third term
in the sequence of wisdom, eloquence, and prudence. Wisdom as character-
ized above is thought directed to the whole. It agrees with G.W.F. Hegel's
maxim, "The True is the whole."'84 To know something as true is to know
the whole course of what it is. Eloquence is to put the sense of the whole
into words.
Forensic oratory is a key to this principle because it shows how elo-
quence actually functions in human affairs. The parts of the speech of the
law courts are the parts of eloquence itself. In a small work, The Art of
Humane Education, I have argued that teaching is a form of eloquence.
85
To speak as a whole requires a beginning. The beginning expands into a
complete narration of the subject under consideration, and from the narra-
tion arguments are brought forth to demonstrate its importance and signifi-
cance. 86 Once all is said, it is resaid in brief, and impressed upon the
hearers' minds and their hearts. The hearers have been instructed and de-
lighted. It remains for them to be moved. The essence of moral philosophy
is prudence.
Ancient ethics centered on the question of what is the best life-
pleasure, honor, or contemplation. Aristotle mentions a fourth, the pursuit
of business, but this merges with pleasure and honor. The Aristotelian
mean (meson) is a method for the cultivation of virtues. It is a way for the
individual to learn how to act in accordance with virtue by attempting to
avoid extremes. Thus to pursue generosity in a given area, such as the use
of money, the actor attempts to avoid the extremes of being either a spend-
thrift or a miser. In making his choice he must choose, choose knowingly,
and choose from a consistent character-he must be himself when attempt-
ing to be virtuous. Attempting to realize the virtues as guides to his actions
in all areas of human affairs, the actor may with practice achieve eudaimo-
nia-the happiness of acting in accord with excellence in all he does. I
select this Aristotelian model because it is in accord with Vico's insistence
84. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT 11 (A.V. Miller trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1977).
85. DONALD PHILLIP VERENE, THE ART OF HUMANE EDUCATION 1-14 (2002).




that ethics be social. Vico eschews both Stoicism and Epicureanism as
ethics of solitaries.
Modem ethics-Kantian deontological ethics or utilitarian ethics-are
criterion-oriented. They embody the view that ethics is decision-making
and decisions require a criterion to guide them. This criterion must be ra-
tional and unvarying. It is a principle of certainty that can be applied to
situations that are contingent, thus directing us out of the contingency to a
correct determination of what we are to do. As John Dewey points out,
there is customary morality and reflective morality. 87 Customary morality
is generally unproblematic: a situation presents itself and we follow custom
in acting on or in it. Reflective morality occurs when custom offers no clear
course in a situation that is problematic in that it contains a conflict of two
or more courses of action, each of which has moral attractions or merits.
The reflective nature of the problematic situation leads us to seek a crite-
rion by which a decision can be made. We can resort to some version of the
categorical imperative of Kantian ethics or we can resort to seeking the
greatest good for the greatest number, as advocated by Utilitarianism.
Neither of these as such offers us a means to resolve the pros and cons
of a particular ethical issue. More is needed. The door is open to applied
ethics, and it crosses the threshold to enter every aspect of life and society.
In fact-finding coupled with elaborate argumentations, distinctions, and
projections, the applied ethicist bears down in problematic situations, ad-
vancing toward possible decisions. When we examine these we are left
with an unease. It is the same unease that technological man has about the
world-that something is left out. What is left out is self-knowledge. There
is no technique for the ancient ideal of self-knowledge, which is the key to
wisdom. The cogito knows only that it is. It does not know and has no prin-
ciple of access to what it is or what it means to be what it is.
The applied ethicist is Epimethean, "heedless. ''8 8 The approach of the
applied ethicist to the human condition through facts and argumentation
leaves out all of human tradition and, most importantly, how human tradi-
tion has formed itself as a wisdom in the law.
The name of Prometheus is prudence, foresight. Aristotle's method of
the mean is a method of prudence. By acting in a manner guided by a vir-
tue, something is learned about bringing a specific virtue into practice. To
act subsequently on it is to become progressively attuned to the virtue. No
criterion is applied. The pursuit of a criterion is a false science of ethics. It
87. JOHN DEWEY, THEORY OF THE MORAL LIFE 3-28 (Irvington Publishers, Inc. 1980) (1908).
88. On Prometheus and Epimetheus, see PLATO, Protagoras, in LACHES, PROTAGORAS, MENO,
EUTHYDEMUS 85, 129-33 (W.R.M. Lamb trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1924).
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is modeled on the idea of applied science. It is no accident that Immanuel
Kant condemns both prudence in ethics and rhetoric in theory of knowl-
edge.89 Descartes and Locke, the founders of modem epistemology, also
condemn rhetoric. Descartes does so in the Discourse, as we have seen;
John Locke, in the Essay, calls rhetorical speeches "perfect cheats." 90 A
true science of ethics, I believe, can be formed on the basis of the science
of law or jurisprudence. My claim is simple and it is difficult to think that it
has not been claimed before, but so far as I know it is new.
This view agrees with the Roman view that the law can be regarded as
philosophy in the sense of civil wisdom-a knowledge of things human
and divine. The study of the law is the basis of the wisdom needed to be
applied in any particular case that calls for moral choice and action. Thus
the law stands in the place of the criterion sought in Kantian or Utilitarian
ethics as the basis of applied ethics. What is required to act in a moral
situation is foresight into it: how it has arisen, how it has developed, and
what course it is most likely to take. For this the above-mentioned "good
eye" is needed. All true ethics is "applied" ethics, but not in the sense of
universal principles that are rationally applied to particular cases to resolve
or seem to resolve what is problematic in them. I hold with Maclntyre that
all ethical judgments develop within traditions, and when they become
known, principles of conduct within them are applied back to the moral
situations that are bounded within that tradition. This dialectical moment is
exactly how Aristotle's mean functions. It requires tradition to be effective.
The view that any ethics requires a tradition has been criticized on the
grounds of relativism-is one tradition simply as good as another? The
answer to this criticism lies in the principle of ius gentium. Any doctrine of
prudence that looks to the law as a basis for ethical judgment cannot con-
sider only the ius civile of a given tradition for its precedents. It must look
within a given tradition for that part of its ius civile that is universal, that
connects to the principle of ius gentium.
Ethical principles arise out of human practice, not out of abstract for-
mulation of universal rules that are held to apply to all human conditions at
all times. These principles are themselves practice, but they are not simply
customary morality, as they have an element of reflection in them. They are
89. Immanuel Kant dismisses prudence (Klugheit) as a proper understanding of moral action.
IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 33 n.5 (Lewis White Beck trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1959) (1785). In the Critique of Judgment, Kant dismisses ars oratoria, claim-
ing it "ist gar keiner Actung wiirdig"-"unworthy of any respect whatsoever." IMMANUEL KANT,
CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 198 n.63 (Werner S. Pluhar trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1987) (1790).
90. 2 JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 146 (Alexander Campbell
Fraser ed., Oxford Clarendon Press 1894) (1689).
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recognized as principles of that tradition and are guides to the sense of the
Good that is within it. This process of the interaction of situation and prin-
ciple is jurisprudential in its form, as it has behind it the sense of precedent
cases. It is further jurisprudential as it actually looks to the law as a system
of wisdom to guide and form ethical or moral conscience.
The prudence needed to guide choice is to be found in jurisprudence-
in what can be learned from the law; what principles of the human world
can be brought to bear; and further, what precedents may be appealed to.
All has happened in human affairs, and no particular situation that arises is
without analog with the past. New precedents arise, but they arise always in
relation to what has gone before. All that has happened has made its way
into the law and resides there, to be drawn forth. On this view, then, juris-
prudence and the law become the basis of ethics, just as ethics in the form
of custom was originally the basis of the law itself in any society. All laws,
however, in order truly to be laws must be embodiments of Law, that is,
they must be in accord with the authority of human reason. In contrast to
the vacuity of criterion-based ethics, ethics based on jurisprudence supplies
any situation requiring a moral decision with a content. What has gone
before in human affairs that applies to a particular situation is the beginning
point for a moral decision. The decision will be based on reasoning by
analogy from past resolutions of similar situations.
Ethics is not a realm separate from the law in which various rights are
pursued or weighed in given circumstances. Attention to jurisprudence as
an active guide to human prudence puts aside any need for rights-theory.
Ethics becomes a part of jurisprudence, not something separate from it
requiring different principles. Although no commentator has brought this
out, I believe the foregoing is the view implicit in Vico's approach to juris-
prudence in the Study Methods and it is his explicit intent in his Universal
Law. Prudence is at once a virtue and a practical wisdom.
In his Synopsis of Universal Law, the condensed statement of his doc-
trine of jurisprudence, Vico says:
He makes of virtue three parts-prudence, temperance, and fortitude-
that regulate the three parts of man: prudence, intelligence; temperance,
caprice; fortitude, force; and that human reason embraced by the will is
virtue insofar as it combats cupidity, and this same virtue is justice inso-
far as it gauges utilities. And thus from the three parts of virtue he brings
forth three rights or reasons: dominion, liberty, and tutelage [i.e., guardi-
anship, security]. From prudence, or just choice of utilities, comes do-
minion; from temperance or moderation of the self s will and things
pertaining to it, comes liberty; from fortitude, or moderated force, comes
2008]
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tutelage, and these three parts of justice are the three sources of all com-
monwealths and all laws.9 1
Prudence is what regulates temperance and fortitude that are all re-
quired in any act of moral choice. On these the law is based and it is from
their presence in the law that we may learn how they are to function in
particular human affairs. This view of the law as the basis of morals takes
the law beyond its confinement in police departments, the courts, and the
law offices and restores it as the wisdom necessary to human actions in
society. It makes the study of the law and jurisprudence, just as Vico con-
ceives it, one of the humanities, something that needs to be learned by eve-
ryone, not as an abstract subject-matter but as part of the circle of studies
that is the ground of self-knowledge.
If it is true, as Cicero claims, and Vico quotes, that children on the
streets of Rome sang the Law of the Twelve Tables as a song,92 the view I
have proposed would restore this sense of the law as the prime formulation
of human behavior in the civitas. In saying this I intend no encomium of
the law but only to give it its due, its own justice.
91. Giambattista Vico, Synopsis of Universal Law, in 21 NEW VICO STUDIES 1, 4 (Donald Phillip
Verene trans., 2003).
92. CICERO, De Legibus, in DE REPUBLICA, DE LEGIBUS 12, 445 (Clinton Walker Keyes trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press 1928); NEW SCIENCE, supra note 32, 469. On Vico's Universal Law and rights
theory see DONALD PHILLIP VERENE, KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS HUMAN AND DIVINE 119-42 (2003); on
memory and ethics see DONALD PHILLIP VERENE, PHILOSOPHY AND THE RETURN TO SELF-
KNOWLEDGE 192-242 (1997).
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